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Individuals Matter: Exploring Strategies of Individuals to Change the
Water Policy for the Tisza River in Hungary
Saskia E. Werners, Piotr Matczak, and Zsuzsanna Flachner
ABSTRACT. This paper offers a novel interpretation of the introduction of floodplain rehabilitation and
rural development into the water policy for the Tisza River in Hungary. It looks at the role of individuals
and the strategies that they used to bring about water policy change. Five strategies are explored: developing
new ideas, building coalitions to sell ideas, using windows of opportunity, playing multiple venues and
orchestrating networks. Our discussion on the importance of each strategy and the individuals behind it is
based on interviews, group discussions and a literature review. The international and political attention
sparked by a series of floods, dike failure and a major cyanide spill, which preceded national elections,
opened a window of opportunity for launching ideas. A new regional coalition successfully introduced
floodplain rehabilitation into the water policy arena. Our analysis emphasizes the importance of a
responsible civil servant who recognizes a new policy idea at an abstract level and a credible regional
coalition that advocates the new idea regionally.
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The whole world had already been created
when the Tisza was standing alone before
the Lord's throne. Then Jesus took a golden
plough, harnessed a donkey to it and told
the Tisza to follow. Thus he set the plough
against the soil and ploughed the bed for
the river, which followed faithfully
everywhere. However thistles were scattered
all around. The donkey, which was feeling
hungry reached after one and then another,
leaving a straight path. This is why the Tisza
is so unpredictable, so winding and
meandering.
- Hungarian folk tale 
INTRODUCTION
This paper analyzes the early 21st-century transition
in water policy for the Tisza River in northeastern
Hungary. In the spring of 2003, the Hungarian
government issued a decree that marked a
substantial shift in water management. The new
water policy for the Tisza River recognized rural
development and nature conservation as important
objectives alongside flood protection. Floodplain
rehabilitation and land-use change were introduced
as water management measures to replace or
complement the prevailing engineering approaches,
which primarily favored flood levee construction.
From an external perspective, this change in policy
was surprising given that for 150-years water
management had been dominated by river
normalization, flood levees and drainage of
floodplains, mainly serving the interests of large-
scale agriculture. The development and implementation
of the new water policy, called the New Vásárhelyi
Plan, between 1998 and 2006 is the main object of
investigation of this paper. The changes in water
policy for the Tisza have been previously analyzed
for example, they have been discussed from a
governance perspective (Werners et al. 2009). This
paper takes a new approach by assessing the role of
individual actors and the strategies that they used in
bringing about policy change.
We build on our research in a series of Hungarian
and international research projects. We collected
data in three ways: through twenty interviews with
actors from national and regional organizations
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(ministries, water authorities, planners, academic
institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
municipalities, and farmers); through a series of
group discussions with local and national
stakeholders; and by an analysis of policy and
project planning documents and background
studies.
We begin with an account of why we call the water
policy changes a transition. Next, we describe the
changes from the perspective of five strategies
(Huitema and Meijerink 2009; Huitema and
Meijerink 2010):
 
1. Developing new ideas (cf. Hajer 1995,
Baumgartner and Jones 2002, van der Brugge
et al. 2005);
 
2.  Building coalitions for selling ideas (cf.
Sabatier 1988, Folke et al. 2005, Olsson et al.
2006);
 
3.  Recognizing and exploiting windows of
opportunity (cf. Kingdon 1995);
 
4. Using multiple venues (cf. Baumgartner and
Jones 2002); and
 
5.  Orchestrating networks (cf. Folke et al. 2005,
Caniëls and Romijn 2008).
 
 We then discuss the importance of each strategy
and provide a review of the individuals behind it.
Our analysis shows the importance of 1) responsible
civil servants who recognize a new policy idea at a
conceptual level and 2) a credible regional coalition
that advocates the policy concept. The international
attention and domestic political focus following the
2000 cyanide disaster on the Tisza River, the 2001
floods, and the 2002 national elections provided a
window of opportunity for the adoption of the new
water policy. Ambiguity about the practical
application of new policy concepts and the
responsibilities of different actors initially
facilitated consensus on the new water policy but
has since hampered its implementation.
BACKGROUND: TISZA RIVER BASIN AND
THE TRANSITION IN WATER POLICY
A short historical overview of water management
in the Tisza River Basin helps provide the context
for and arguments why the changes introduced into
Tisza water policy may be called a transition in
water policy. The Tisza River is the largest tributary
of the Danube, receiving water from the Carpathian
Mountains in Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine. The
Tisza River Basin holds almost fifty percent of
Hungarian territory. Until the 18th century, river
management was mainly organized around the
operation of a system of small streams and channels
regulating the water flow between the main riverbed
and the floodplain (Balogh 2002). The inundation
frequency determined land use. Mosaic floodplain
production systems combined plough land, forest,
floodplain orchards, meadows for cattle grazing,
and fisheries (Andrásfalvy 1973). Since the 1750s,
the Tisza River has been heavily modified. To cater
to large-scale mono-agriculture, mills and river
transport, the river was canalized and straightened,
and the floodplains were drained. The 19th century
First Vásárhelyi Plan set out the main changes. Dike
building, river regulation, and floodplain drainage
decreased the total naturally flooded area by eighty-
four percent (see Figure 1). These changes ended
the traditional water management system and the
related production systems on which the
communities along the river had relied (Bellon
2004).
The recurrence and high visibility of floods caused
resources to be funneled into an extensive flood
defense system (Vári 2001). Over a period of 150
years, deforestation and river normalization made
the river flow more extreme and, together with
population growth in the low-lying reclaimed
floodplain, added to flood risks (Fejér 2004). In
addition to flooding, water management was though
to contribute to problems such as drought, water
stagnation, soil salinisation, and the degradation of
peat lands and wetlands (Vámosi 2002). The
communist era following the Second World War
advanced large-scale tillage and agricultural
production systems that required floodplain
drainage. Privatization at the beginning of the 1990s
led to a drop in the operation and maintenance of
the large irrigation systems and a decrease in
agricultural output. At present, a high unemployment
rate, aging, and migration challenge the region
socio-economically (Sendzimir et al. 2004,
Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2006). On a more positive
note, the region has great potential for recreation
and nature conservation (Vári et al. 2003).
The annual floods that returned in 1998 after twenty
years of drought were a driving force behind the
development of a new water policy for the Tisza
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Fig. 1. Tisza River Basin: river regulation has reduced river length by one third and the floodplain area
by 80 per cent.
River: the New Vásárhelyi Plan (in Hungarian:
Vásárhelyi-Terv Továbbfejlesztése (VTT)). Interviewees
distinguished three stages in the development and
implementation of the VTT:
 
1. 1999 - 2001: The water authority and the
Ministry of Transport, Communication and
Water announced the first policy plan. The
goal of the first policy plan was flood
protection with nature conservation considered
where appropriate. Single-purpose flood
retention reservoirs were the main innovation.
The plan was mostly the work of the water
authorities. National NGOs, such as WWF-
Hungary, were invited to comment. Local
NGOs protested against the plan, especially
the new coalition Bokartisz.
 
2. 2002 - 2003: During this period, there was
intensive collaboration between government
bodies, regional NGOs, and research
institutes. National government involvement
was broadened and organized through an
inter-ministerial committee chaired by the
Ministry of Environment and Water
(established after the 2002 reorganization of
the Ministry of Transport, Communication
and Water) and involving the Ministry of
Agriculture and Rural Development, the
Regional Development Agency, and other
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ministries (for example, social and labor).
Two government decrees were passed.
Government Decree 1022/2003 of February
2003 acknowledged floodplain revitalization,
nature conservation, and rural development
as objectives next to flood protection. It
ordered the development of an implementation
plan for the first six retention reservoirs,
including rural development and floodplain
rehabilitation at local stakeholders' request.
Government Act LXVII of 2004 endorsed the
implementation plan.
 
3. 2004 - Present: This period represents the
implementation of the new policy. The
approval of project sites has been delayed.
The implementation focuses on building
emergency retention reservoirs. The associated
rural development lags behind.
 
Why do we call the development and
implementation of the new water policy a
transition? Huitema and Meijerink (2009; 2010)
postulate that a transition in water policy should
become visible in a reorientation of the policy
substance or the governance paradigm. The water
policy endorsed in 2003 explicitly recognizes rural
development and nature conservation as important
objectives alongside flood protection. Floodplain
rehabilitation and land-use change were introduced
to replace or complement flood levees that had been
the preferred solution in water management for 150
years (Figure 2). The national planning agency
VÁTI facilitated the intense collaboration of a large
number of regional and national actors during the
preparation of the implementation plan. This
collaboration broke the hegemony of the water
authority. Regional interests were represented by
regional organizations such as the new Bokartisz
coalition, founded in 2001 by the councils of twelve
municipalities, three non-profit organizations (E-
Misszió, the Hungarian Environmental Economics
Centre and Palocsa Association) and individual
scientists (http://makk.zpok.hu/en/node/118). An
inter-ministerial committee made major decisions
in consultation with regional and civic
organizations. At the National Meeting of
Environmental and Nature Conservationist Organizations
in 2003, the environmental NGO E-Misszió was
elected for full membership in the inter-ministerial
committee, which allowed E-Misszió to make
proposals, vote and veto. Actors involved in the
development and/or implementation of the new
water policy reported a "paradigm shift" or "new
philosophy". The government brochure for the new
water policy also captured this shift in its text and
new logo (Figure 2c). The brochure also introduced
examples of the rural development and nature
conservation component of the policy (VITUKI
2004):
The government has adopted on the 15 of
October, 2003 a decision on the most
ambitious rural development program of
past decades [...] The program reflects a
new government philosophy, in that it takes
as far as possible into consideration the
interests of environmental protection and
nature conservation. [...] The complex
project, the basic aim of which is to raise
the living standards of the people in the
Tisza Region, whilst ensuring a higher level
of flood safety, would be accompanied by a
number of important infrastructural
developments. These include land drainage
and sewerage, afforestation, construction
of cycling lanes, as well as environment
management schemes, like the creation of
a mosaic landscape pattern by water
routing, streamlet rehabilitation, and
conveying the water down the full length of
the flood bed.
The substance of water policy and the process by
which it was designed mark a transition in
accordance with the definition of Huitema and
Meijerink (2009; 2010). We therefore chose the
development of the Tisza water policy as the subject
of this paper.
RESULTS: EXPLORING STRATEGIES OF
INDIVIDUALS
This section explores the role of individuals in the
development and implementation of the new
Vásárhelyi water policy (VTT) from the perspective
of the five strategies set forth in the introduction of
this paper.
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Fig. 2. a) Tisza River at Tiszadada; b) Oxbow lake: traditional water management used oxbows and
creeks for water regulation. This inspired the new water management plan; c) Logo and motto for new
Vásárhelyi water policy in government brochure (VITUKI 2004); and d) Bicycle lane on retention
reservoir dike for rural development (Photos: Werners, 2007).
Develop new ideas
In this section, we investigate the origin of the idea
of floodplain rehabilitation, rural development, and
nature conservation as introduced into Tisza water
policy in 2003. We asked different parties about the
origin of this idea and whether one person or group
of people could be identified as its source. Members
from the Bokartisz coalition point to their own
organization and specifically to its leader, Géza
Molnár, as the key individual behind the idea of
floodplain rehabilitation in the Tisza Region. They
claim that their work initiated discussion of the idea
within the region and brought the idea to the national
level. Since the 1980s, Géza Molnár has studied the
floodplain management system in the Tisza valley
combining field experiments and document analysis
(Andrásfalvy 1973, Bellon 1991). Together with a
small group of farmers and landowners, he restored
and experimented with traditional water steering
systems on a small scale at various locations along
the Tisza. Based on these two decades of individual
experiments and theoretical studies, the founders of
the Bokartisz coalition developed their concept of
integrated floodplain management and floodplain
rehabilitation with the aim of re-creating a mosaic
landscape structure and recurring shallow flooding
for sustainable rural development. Coalition
members began advocating their concept under the
name "Last Straw" in 2001 (Botos et al. 2002). It is
important to stress that Bokartisz did not present
floodplain rehabilitation as something new but
rather referred back to floodplain utilization before
river regulation. Their concepts derived from the
shallow flooding, mosaic land-use, and community
management of small-scale water infrastructure that
was common in the Tisza region in the period
between 1500 and 1700.
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We distinguish between the concept of floodplain
rehabilitation that Bokartisz members advocated
and the more detailed implementation plans for
certain locations along the Tisza, particularly the
Bodrogköz area. Working both on the more abstract
concept and its practical implementation at
particular locations, Bokartisz members discussed
the feasibility of the concept with local mayors,
farmers, national park authorities, and NGOs and
demonstrated its application. In the words of a
representative of the Hungarian Environmental
Economics Centre and founder of Bokartisz
(personal communication, 9 August 2007,
Budapest): "after we founded Bokartisz, we began
to elaborate a land-use and flood protection plan for
the Bodrogköz. By the end of 2002, start of 2003,
the concept was put together. The engine, of course,
was Géza Molnár."
What is significant here is that the idea to promote
floodplain rehabilitation came from a bottom-up
process based on two decades of practical local
experience. It was negotiated with local
municipalities in cooperation with a small
interdisciplinary group of researchers. These actors
combined elements of the traditional water steering
system with floodplain rehabilitation and rural
development. Thus, the new idea was developed in
response to local problems independent of the
national policy process and the problems recognized
by the national administration.
The Bokartisz founders' knowledge of the local
situation and of floodplain rehabilitation is
impressive. We had to analyze, however, how
widely this explanation of the origin of the new idea
and its development was supported. A series of
interviews and a public survey carried out between
2000 and 2001 in the Tisza region reveal that
opinions on flood protection differ. Opinions range
from increasing the height of the whole levee
system, a measure supported by most water
authority experts, to pursuing alternative solutions
like partial rehabilitation of the floodplains and
removal of levees to create natural reservoirs, ideas
supported by most local mayors and NGOs (Vári et
al. 2003). In our interviews in 2007 and 2008,
mayors who are members of Bokartisz and farmers
who collaborate with Bokartisz share the opinion
that Bokartisz originated the alternative solutions.
The planning agency VÁTI, also names Bokartisz
as the originator. Other stakeholders, however, hold
the alternative notion that new solutions emerged
from the debates among different actors and cannot
be attributed to a single player. The water board
director for the larger Bodrogköz area recalls
(personal communication, 22 August 2007,
Sárospatak):
I have no clear memory when new ideas
were introduced. It was more a vision and
an evolutionary process. Many people were
asking: 'If there is an option to keep the
water, what extra benefits could this
provide?' It was quite obvious not to use the
reservoir only once every 30 years, when
there is a high flood. [...] this area has low
agricultural value. Nature restoration was
mentioned as a potential income source.
For example, in 2002 the environmentally
sensitive zones were launched and gave a
push to this thinking. Later, the agro-
environmental payments were introduced.
And we are still waiting for other financial
opportunities that will be attached to the
reservoir-polder scheme.
The administrative agencies bring another
perspective on the origin of new ideas incorporated
into the water policy. The then-ministerial head of
department responsible for the new water policy
(Department of Water Damage Prevention at the
Ministry of Transport, Communication and Water)
does not recall that floodplain revitalization and a
rural development program were new elements in
the water policy that the counties in the region had
to request. Instead, he argues that the first version
of the new water policy already allowed for these
elements as the main innovation, the retention
reservoirs, was already foreseen (personal
communication, 30 October 2006, Budapest). In
addition, the national government knew that, as an
accession country to the European Union (EU), it
would soon have to comply with European
Directives like the Water Framework Directive
(Commission of the European Communities 2000a)
and was keen to make use of European funds. Civil
servants were aware that ideas in line with integrated
water management and rural development were
more likely to comply with requirements attached
to European support than classic flood protection.
Representatives from various ministries had
participated in European consultations and study
tours where the prospects of regional support were
presented. The head of the Hungarian office of the
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) had
experience working on the WWF Living Rivers
Project and brought this experience to his position
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as a member of the body charged with preparation
of the new water policy in 2000 (Zöckler et al. 2000).
However, notwithstanding these international
influences, integral and participatory planning were
relatively new in Hungarian water management.
Many people at the water and planning authority
had been trained as civil engineers and strongly
believed in river normalization. Under the socialist
regime, the water authority had always been a strong
hierarchical organization with significant financial
resources (Fejér 2004).
In the international context, the degree to which
introducing floodplain rehabilitation was new is
debatable. The concept of river rehabilitation did
not originate from Hungary. Hungarian scientists
and government officials may have taken
inspiration from other countries. For example, in
2000, Hungarian scientists participated in the
Conference on River Restoration in Europe that
concluded with the following statement: "River
restoration is internationally popular. Many river
restoration projects are being implemented. River
restoration will even get higher attention within the
framework of the implementation of the European
Water Framework Directive" (Fokkens 2001).
Many countries were considering non-structural or
"soft" measures from a sustainability perspective
(Kundzewicz 2002, Meijerink 2005). Were there
signs of investigation of river restoration and
rehabilitation in the Hungarian scientific community?
In the seventies, a small number of scientists in the
region had studied the traditional water
management system. Publications focused on the
operation of the traditional system without making
a link to present-day water management
(Andrásfalvy 1973). In the eighties and nineties,
scientists in Budapest engaged in similar studies
(Lászlóffy 1982). Karácsonyi (2001) published one
of the first papers in English covering the topic.
Building on the Association for Local and Regional
Development's study (1997), his paper highlighted
the benefits of reintroducing the traditional system
and floodplain rehabilitation, but did not reference
a new water policy. More recently, national and
international researchers started to publish on the
traditional water management system to cope with
present flood risks (e.g., Vári 2001, Linnerooth-
Bayer and Vári 2003, Sendzimir et al. 2004).
In summary, we identified two main sources of the
new ideas regarding water policy in the Tisza. Those
individuals involved with the Bokartisz coalition
insist that their group developed the new ideas
independently of the government. Members of
Bokartisz - and especially its leader - combined
elements from historical analysis, theory, and field
experiments. In this view, the origin of the new ideas
is mostly local. On the other hand, people within the
administration point out that some elements were
already present in the first version of the water
policy and that the new ideas evolved from the
interactions during the development of the plan.
What emerges from these separate points of view is
that the recognition by "both sides" of the ideas as
their own, or at least as ideas that were not foreign,
may have been instrumental in their incorporation
into the water policy in 2003.
Build coalitions to sell ideas
This section explores the strategy of individuals to
build coalitions for selling new ideas. Using the
definition set forth by Huitema and Meijerink
(2009), we define coalitions as groups of actors from
more than one organization with shared beliefs and
explicit agreements on how to use resources to
achieve common goals. Various regional and
national NGOs emerged in Hungary in the 1980s
that focused on rural development and nature
conservation. In the Tisza region, a series of
independent, locally driven initiatives began in the
1990s and each aimed to improve the economic and
ecological situation at the local level (Government
of Hungary and UNDP - GEF 2004). Typically,
these initiatives involved local government, local
representatives, NGOs, private companies, and
scientists from a micro-region and covered one to
several thousand hectares. To capitalize on local
experience and to strengthen cooperation, Bokartisz
was established in 2001 as a non-profit organization.
Its legal status allowed Bokartisz to attract funding
and become the program office for a landscape
rehabilitation program that produced a set of
concepts that were discussed and endorsed by all its
members. Beyond concept development, coalition
members contributed in various ways. The
participating municipalities gave moral support and
support in kind (for example, by offering office
facilities). Scientific and technical support came
from researchers at national institutes. Together
with Bokartisz members, these researchers assessed
whether Bokartisz' concepts could lead to
sustainable regional benefits.
We propose that linking traditional local water
management with contemporary notions of nature
Ecology and Society 15(2): 24
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss2/art24/
conservation and rural development prepared the
ground for the new coalition to be formed. For the
purpose of this paper, we focus on Bokartisz as a
case of a coalition aiming at water policy change.
We start by analyzing the relationship between
Bokartisz and the development of the VTT. In the
autumn of 2001, Bokartisz hosted a meeting in the
region where the responsible ministry also
presented its first version of the water policy.
According to the leader of Bokartisz (personal
communication, 22 August 2007, Bodrogköz), "We
had our concept ready and wanted to present it at
this meeting." This summarizes the belief of the
founders of Bokartisz that the new ideas were
developed first, independently of the new water
policy. Only when the government made its initial
presentation did Bokartisz members realize that it
went against the new concept they had developed.
In 2002, they started to formulate their critique
against the VTT. According to a founder of
Bokartisz from the Hungarian Environmental
Economics Centre (personal communication, 9
August 2007, Budapest):
It was a great shock to see the VTT in that
form with the 13 reservoirs [...] it was
against our concept as Géza analyzed it.
The good thing for our concept was that the
plan could not be done between two dikes,
and water had to be channeled into
reservoirs. The bad thing was that the core
of the plan was against the holistic
floodplain concept because its only aim was
to decrease the flood level between the
dikes. There was not much attention to what
happens in and between the reservoirs.
Bokartisz held the prevailing water management
approach responsible for many problems in the
Tisza region. This opinion was supported by
scientists who had concluded that the flood defense
system had reached its limits, and dike construction
alone could not accommodate higher flood levels
(Timár and Rácz 2002). A central person at the
Hungarian Environmental Economics Centre and
Bokartisz founder recalls (personal communication,
9 August 2007, Budapest):
In the beginning of 2003, we issued a
statement that the VTT in this form cannot
be accepted as it conflicts with rational
land-use. As NGOs do, we issued it to the
press and raised our voice at all venues. As
a result, the Ministry [Ministry of
Transport, Communication and Water,
represented by the responsible Head of
Department and his Deputy] said: 'Let the
civic organizations and NGOs tell what they
would like.' [...] A meeting was organized
in Budapest where Géza [Molnár] and
Tamas Cseloszki presented the concept for
the Bodrogköz and the whole Tisza. [...]
This point of view was channeled into the
VTT, it seemed. For me, my impression is
that the high level leaders responsible for
water management understood that we did
not only like to shout, but that we had a
concept and could work it out if given the
opportunity.
In February 2003, the Hungarian government
endorsed the decree that included rehabilitation of
the primary floodplain and rural development as
objectives for the new water policy along with flood
protection. These objectives were still far from the
main innovation that Bokartisz was calling for: to
channel water into the landscape and to connect
water bodies. However, Bokartisz became one of
the partners in developing the implementation plan
and its leaders were thus given the opportunity to
"sell" their concept.
These series of events suggest that Bokartisz
members managed to convince other parties to
consider their new concept. The question is then
raised when they felt their ideas were taken seriously
and the degree to which they were deliberately
strategic in their efforts towards this result. As
recalled by a founder of Bokartisz from the
Hungarian Environmental Economics Centre
(personal communication, 9 August 2007,
Budapest):
The moment was maybe the first
negotiations in spring 2003 and then when
it became part of the planning in summer
2003. The proof was when we saw our work
as an attachment to the government decree.
We [the founders of Bokartisz] said then:
'It's real' [...] It came as a surprise. As an
expert and NGO you get accustomed that
you write papers, you send them in, you give
your own statement, and nothing happens.
Sometimes when it happens, when you open
the revised plan and you find your own
proposal there, it is a big surprise. 
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This account suggests that founding the Bokartisz
coalition was important in uniting the voice of
various organizations in the region that had not
previously been heard. The Bokartisz founders
developed their concept in time for it to be
considered in the new water policy, although they
had not timed for this. Instead, the coalition joined
the opposition as soon as it considered the new water
policy at odds with its own concept. Representing
the larger Bokartisz coalition, a small group of two
to three people communicated with the central
administration. They presented decision makers at
the Ministry of Environment and Water with their
critique together with their new ideas. Is this account
of events enough to explain the transition in water
policy? And why did the transition occur at that
particular moment in time? Who allowed Bokartisz
to become a partner at the negotiation table? We
consider these questions in the next section by
reviewing the transition in water policy and key
actors from the perspective of "windows of
opportunity."
Create and use windows of opportunity
This section assesses whether a window of
opportunity was created, recognized or used to
launch new ideas. First we describe the three streams
that must couple for such windows to be exploited
successfully: the problem stream (issue on the
public agenda); the political stream (issue on the
political agenda); and the policy stream (attention
to policy options related to the issue) (Kingdon
1995).
Looking at the problem stream, events began in
1998 with the first major flood in the Tisza for
twenty years. The floods that followed annually
each produced a new record water level in at least
one section of the river (Timár and Rácz 2002). In
2000, the eyes of the world were on the Tisza when,
in January, a cyanide spill at a gold mine in nearby
Romania wiped out aquatic life and led to several
tons of dead fish being pulled from the Tisza. Then,
in March, floodwaters rose to a 100-year high.
Summer followed with a record-breaking heat
wave. Another disaster occurred in 2001 when
embankments broke at two places and the Bereg
region was flooded, seriously damaging two
thousand houses. In Figure 3, we illustrate the
problem stream by looking at the Tisza news
coverage. We approximate news coverage by the
number of occurrences per month of the words
"Tisza" together with "water" in Google News
between 1998 and 2007 (line in Figure 3). News
coverage shows clear peaks around the time of the
floods in November 1998, March 1999, and 2001.
The Tisza River received the most attention in
international news around the flood and cyanide
spill in 2000 and the floods in 2001 and 2006.
Figure 3 also illustrates the political stream by
tracking the attention paid to the Tisza on websites
of the coalition government parties. The figure
shows the normalized total number of hits per year
for Google searches of the coalition parties'
websites. The 2001 flood happened during the
election campaigns and attracted sizeable political
attention. Judging by website coverage of the topic,
political parties' interest in the Tisza also spiked in
2006. This attention coincided with the 2006
elections and another major flood. A second
illustration of the political stream in Figure 3 is the
level of attention paid to the Tisza by the Hungarian
parliament. We approximated this attention by
reviewing the number of occurrences of the word
"Tisza" per year on the parliament website (http://
www.mkogy.hu). Figure 3 shows how the Tisza
gained importance on the parliamentarian agenda
in 2000 and peaked in 2004 when parliament
approved the "Tisza Law". The figure also shows
that attention has waned and that the Tisza has not
attracted the same level of parliamentary attention
since 2004.
A combined account of the problem, political, and
policy streams suggest that the 1998, 2000, and 2001
flood events sparked a sense of urgency at the
political level to develop a new water policy for the
Tisza. In June 2002, a new coalition of socialists
and free democrats replaced the conservative,
center-right government. The coalition members
wanted to put their mark on the ongoing policy
process that they had inherited. From this
perspective, the autumn of 2002 provided an
excellent opportunity for the introduction of new
ideas. For the window of opportunity to open, the
high visibility of the problem stream, the negative
attention for existing policy options and the
changing institutional context may have been
crucial. As discussed in previous sections of this
paper, the Bokartisz coalition had by this time
published its ideas and started to actively oppose
the existing version of the VTT plan. Support for
the existing policy options was waning.
Municipalities and the Hortobágy National Park
authority had rejected the location of a reservoir in
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Fig. 3. Windows of opportunity illustrated by the normalized number of occurrences of specified terms
arising from online search using Google. Note: The incorporation of Internet-based figures comes with
the recognition that the medium has become increasingly used by political parties and that the number of
issues covered on their websites and the number of pages itself have increased. Thus the figure should
be read only as an indication of the changing attention of party websites to the Tisza and not as an
absolute assessment of the political agenda of the parties.
their territory. The need for local support was
becoming increasingly clear within the administration.
At the same time, the Government had to reduce its
budget deficit as a condition for EU membership,
making it imperative to find new sources of
financing (Vári et al. 2003). European legislation,
directives, and funding mechanisms, like the new
agro-environmental support schemes of the
European Common Agricultural Policy, favored
integrated policies and management approaches. In
addition, the EU promoted participation of civil
society for a democratic system of government
(Commission of the European Communities 2000b,
2001). The combination of these factors opened a
window for incorporating new ideas in water policy
development.
Did Bokartisz members actually time their
interventions and local experiments to be ready for
cooperation at the end of 2002 and use this window
of opportunity? Accounts of its founders suggest
that essentially they developed their ideas
independently from the political stream. In contrast,
in our interview, the ministerial head of department
who was at the time responsible for the water policy
expresses a conscious and purposeful consideration
of high-profile problems, national politics, and
policy options. He recollects using the sense of
urgency after recurring floods to first secure
financial support for a new flood protection program
and then turn it into a national program (personal
communication, 30 October 2006, Budapest). He
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recalls his distress when, after the 2002 national
elections, the water authorities were merged with
the environmental authorities and their staff and
budget reduced. This situation created a need to
build new cooperation to ensure successful use of
the window of opportunity. He became Deputy State
Secretary for Water at the new Ministry for
Environment and Water. He suggests that an inter-
ministerial committee was installed at his
instigation to develop the water policy further. This
committee both changed the role of the
administration and added a new venue for the
transition process. We investigate the role of the
new venues in the next section.
Play multiple venues
The previous sections have looked at the origin of
the new ideas, the coalitions that were built to sell
them, and the opportunities for introducing new
ideas into the water policy at a particular moment
in time. Here, we ask whether individuals or groups
of individuals sought out alternative venues to
promote new ideas. We understand venues as the
possible places where policy issues can be debated,
including various levels of government, the forums
of scientists and legislatures, and the media
(Baumgartner and Jones 2002). We focus on the
choice of venue of the actors identified in previous
sections: the national government (particularly the
ministry responsible for water policy), the local
government (including the mayors and water
boards), and the Bokartisz coalition.
By 2000, the EU had become a key new venue for
debating policy requirements and funding
opportunities (Veres 2004). Politicians and civil
servants from the accession countries were actively
briefed on European funding possibilities, such as
structural funds, cohesion funds, and agricultural
subsidies. They were invited to participate in multi-
national projects and conferences in the EU.
Although Europe was not a venue where civil
servants deliberately lobbied for the new water
policy, they recognized the restrictions and
opportunities in the European regulations and
financing conditions. Whereas national funding
previously had supported engineering solutions, the
European financing conditions offered opportunities
for the new idea of river rehabilitation. Government
Decree 1022/2003 on the improvement of the
Vásárhelyi water policy specifies that "financial
resources should be determined with respect to the
European Union's common joint financing
conditions".
To prepare the implementation plan for the water
policy, the national government, at the instigation
of the Ministry of Environment and Water, created
two key new venues. First, it established the inter-
ministerial committee that represented a larger
group of ministries than in the planning stage. The
committee was co-chaired by the Deputy State
Secretary for Water, who had been previously
responsible for the water policy, and a
representative of the Ministry of Agriculture and
Rural Development. The committee intensively
consulted research institutions, national park
authorities, local government, and civic groups
(Váradi 2003). The second venue consisted of five
open public procurement tenders to support the
drafting of the new water policy. VÁTI, the national
planning agency for regional development, and
VIZITERV, the water resources design bureau,
coordinated the tenders. Established through
Government Decree 1022/2003, the tenders
allowed for increased stakeholder involvement and
the representation of local interests in the planning
process.
The Bokartisz members used additional venues to
express their ideas or undermine the existing water
management paradigm. As a coalition with
members from municipalities, NGOs, and the
scientific community, Bokartisz had in-house
experience in playing different venues. Bokartisz
issued protests and statements in the press written
by its environmental NGO members. The rural
development NGOs and municipalities brought
experience with training and information
dissemination. Farmers, in particular, were
approached to participate in pilot projects or public
hearings and training sessions. Just like the national
government, Bokartisz members looked for new
financial instruments; for example, the agro-
environmental support schemes and small pilot
projects that farmers could apply for.
In summary, government official and coalition
members used a number of new venues to sell and
develop the new ideas. The national government
supported the transition in water policy by creating
two new venues: the inter-ministerial committee
and a participatory planning process supported by
open public procurement tenders. The EU offered
new financial instruments and called for more
participatory policy making. Together with the
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national government's focus on European co-
financing, this influenced the prioritization of policy
options. The NGO members in the Bokartisz
coalition used a range of venues to discredit existing
policy options and to lobby locals to support
Bokartisz's ideas.
Orchestrate and manage networks
Turning to the last of the five strategies, we ask how
actors cooperated, what networks played a role in
the transition in water policy and whether (groups
of) individuals actively influenced the operation of
networks. In particular, we analyze whether
individuals influenced the breakthrough in the
development of water policy for the Tisza by
breaking up or providing alternative policy
networks.
Such an analysis requires determining what
networks shaped water management before and
during the transition in water policy. In the 150 years
before the transition, engineering solutions
dominated water management. The water authority
was very powerful, especially under the communist
regime. Engineers were partly trained in the Soviet
Union (Fejér 2004). A strong, informal network of
water authorities and contractors developed during
this period, and many of these individuals still
remain in key positions today. This network entails
cooperation over several decades, but without the
collective organization and explicit agreement on
spending shared resources that are fundamental to
an advocacy coalition such as Bokartisz.
Similarly, the environmental NGOs in Hungary
form a strong network in which many individuals
in key positions know each other from the
communist environmental youth movement. In
2000, the environmentalists were becoming
increasingly organized. They stressed that
continuing levee construction and the resulting
narrowing of the riverbed increased flood risks in
Hungary. At the same time, researchers at the Water
Resources Research Center VITUKI started to study
the merits of water retention (Szlávik 2001a, Szlávik
2001b).
At the regional level, the founders of Bokartisz built
on the existing networks of key players in the region.
The long-running collaboration (or animosity)
between the mayors and other central regional
actors extends well beyond Bokartisz both in time
and number of actors. Networks were built by
people who held central positions in state
enterprises (for example, the agricultural
cooperatives) and in the administration under the
communist regime. In the turbulent times after
1989, well-informed landowners could profit from
land consolidation. The consolidation of land
around the Cigánd reservoir illustrates the
importance of regional players. In our interviews it
was suggested that some mayors and large
landowners speculated on the location of the
reservoir and acquired land shortly before the site
was selected. These individuals could benefit from
expropriation or from the compensation and the
agro-environmental support schemes proposed in
association with the reservoir. Such benefits seem
to have been more important to these players than
any particular water policy. In this manner, they did
not manage the transition in water policy but were
important in influencing site selection and site-
specific implementation. According to a civil
servant from the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural
Development (personal communication, 25
October 2006, Hortobágy):
Local mayors - who might also be members
of Parliament - are among the most
powerful actors. They have a voice in
Ministries, since an important part of
ministerial routine is to give an adequate
response to initiatives coming from the local
administrations; moreover, local mayors
have strong capacity to influence the
process of practical implementation of the
plans and projects.
The research community also deserves notice as a
network of actors involved in the transition.
Bokartisz members - especially Géza Molnár -
report that they took inspiration from scientists to
conduct the 1980s experiments in river
revitalization. Studies of the traditional management
of water and land-use were of particular importance
(e.g., Andrásfalvy 1973, Bellon 1991). Following
the cyanide spill in 2000, an increasing number of
international research projects offered opportunities
to discuss, test, and promote floodplain
management and river rehabilitation. Individuals
from the research community extended their
networks through international research and
development projects. In 2002, the state-owned
Water Resources Research Center (VITUKI) won
the European commission-funded Tisza River
Project on sustainable use of water resources and
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ecological values in the Tisza River Basin (http://
www.tiszariver.com). In 2004, individuals from the
research community together with Bokartisz and
other local organizations secured a substantial
UNDP/GEF project for protecting biodiversity in
the Tisza Basin (http://www.elotisza.hu) and
INTERREG III project funding. The NGO members
in the Bokartisz coalition sought national credibility
by entering domestic and international research
networks. The accreditation of VITUKI gave water
management schemes crucial national support and
legitimacy. As the leader of Bokartisz (personal
communication, 22 August 2007, Bodrogköz)
explains, "that VITUKI in 2002 was willing to test
and support the idea by [hydrological] modeling to
see whether the concept works gave a big push
because it provided the proposed water steering and
shallow flooding with a more scientific foundation."
We cannot currently say to what extent the
emergence of international cooperation through
research projects won new supporters for the
concept of floodplain rehabilitation. We do know,
however, that these projects sustained a dialogue
between Hungarians across the region about
floodplain rehabilitation and rural development. In
addition, we know that the national government was
intent on finding new sources of funding, and the
projects set out above reveal that the new idea of
floodplain rehabilitation attracted more international
support than engineering-dominated solutions.
Members of Bokartisz, especially the researchers,
recognized this opportunity and used it to attract
funding for promoting floodplain rehabilitation.
This cooperation broke up the network of engineers
that had designed most of the recent Hungarian
water infrastructure and initiated a more
interdisciplinary network of researchers. Facilitated
by VÁTI, the tenders following the 2003
government decree allowed this network to test the
new ideas. The VÁTI team leader responsible for
the water policy development process recognizes
the importance of strong regional cooperation and
representation of local interests (personal
communication, 30 October 2006, Budapest):
Another important element in this whole
period is how local interests are
incorporated. It is very difficult to request
from them [local population] because these
areas are [socio-economically] the least
developed [..]. They also have low lobbying
power. The reason why Bokartisz has such
a key role in the whole process is that,
immediately from the beginning, they were
articulating their ideas as a local
stakeholder and had the scientific basis and
support for them. In addition, they were
accepted by the locals. We [VÁTI] are
coming from Budapest, and it would take us
a long time to be accepted by the local
people and to be part of negotiations. So
throughout the work we did, we tried really
to rely on Bokartisz and involve them in the
whole process. They have this kind of
special knowledge about the local situation
that we from Budapest would never have. If
there were more of this high-quality
organized local representation, then the
whole VTT would be much farther ahead.
To summarize, we found strong existing networks
at both the national and the regional level. New
interactions between these networks occurred
around the time of the transition in water policy.
The VÁTI team leader became a major actor due to
her facilitation of discussions between the national
government, scientists, and local representatives.
The VÁTI team admitted Bokartisz as a counterpart
and representative of regional organizations
throughout the planning process. VÁTI's
facilitation of the planning process and its
administration of the tenders for the Ministry of
Environment and Water cracked the network of the
water authority and its engineers and contractors.
DISCUSSION
What can we learn from the Tisza case about
transitions in water policy? The recurring major
floods and the cyanide spill on the Tisza River in
2000 were obviously significant, but in what way?
The floods and resulting damage were severe, but
these two factors were probably not sufficient in
themselves to trigger a transition in water policy.
They did, however, highlight the problem stream
and support regional NGOs' strategy of defining the
prevailing water management as unsustainable and
demanding a different approach. Thus, the events
proved instrumental in broadening the debate about
an alternative water policy. Flood retention and
integrated river basin management already had
supporters in the national government, the academic
world, and major NGOs like WWF. This support
existed, in part, because European directives
advocated these approaches and offered indispensable
financial support for them. Application of these
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approaches required also local support and
experience. The new Bokartisz coalition of
municipalities in the Tisza region, NGOs, and
researchers offered both. The founders of Bokartisz
had just developed their concept of floodplain
rehabilitation and shallow flooding for the Tisza
region and had contextualized it for specific
locations. In the Bodrogköz area in particular,
support from the water board and mayors inside and
outside the Bokartisz coalition was high and
opposition minimal.
The 2002 national elections brought a new coalition
to power. Water affairs were transferred to a new
Ministry of Environment and Water, and this
situation set the scene for the transition to
consolidate in new procedures. The then-upcoming
accession to the European Union favored a shift
towards participatory and integral planning. In this
manner, a window of opportunity for coupling the
new ideas, political will and a relevant problem
opened in 2002 (cf. Kingdon 1995). A key player
to open and use this window was the Head of
Department assigned with the development of the
policy at the Ministry of Transport, Communication
and Water (after the 2002 reorganization, the
Ministry of Environment and Water). A government
decree was passed in February 2003 that
acknowledged floodplain rehabilitation and rural
development and that created two new venues for
preparing the water policy's implementation plan:
an inter-ministerial committee and a series of
tendered studies. VÁTI used the tenders to support
a new network of researchers, NGOs, and local
representatives in creating the spatial plan for the
water policy. The national government endorsed the
implementation with the October 2003 government
decree and the 2004 Tisza law. Endorsement
notwithstanding, since 2004 only two of the first six
retention areas have been built and the related
floodplain rehabilitation and rural development has
either not been attained or attained only after many
delays.
This paper uses the framework of Huitema and
Meijerink (2009; 2010) who postulate that a
transition in water policy should become visible in
a reorientation of the policy substance or the
governance paradigm. Future research may ask
what the implications of this work are for deep
system transformation where the system is
understood and managed in new ways throughout
society (cf. van der Brugge et al. 2005, Folke et al.
2005, Olsson et al. 2006, Pahl-Wostl et al. 2009).
Our account of the transition in water policy
highlights interactions among key individuals and
groups of individuals. It attempts to provide a
credible account of the principal actors involved.
We do not argue that the result of the interactions
was inevitable nor that the policy was "correct", only
that the prevailing conditions and interactions made
its adoption feasible. The narrative is necessarily
compressed and cannot do full justice to the work
of the many people who cooperated in the Tisza.
However, we hope to have conveyed the main thrust
of affairs.
The Tisza case demonstrates the key role of
individuals and confirms the use of the strategies
identified in the introduction to this issue (Huitema
and Meijerink 2010): to develop ideas, to build
coalitions to sell ideas, to use windows of
opportunity, to play multiple venues, and to
orchestrate networks. Closer analysis provides
insight into the use of these five strategies.
Regarding the development and promotion of ideas,
the members in the central coalition who began
small-scale experiments deserve extra attention.
These experiments built trust and physical proof of
cooperation. Here also the interplay of supporters
and opponents of policy change is evident. A main
challenge for the national government was to get
local support. Local farmers, mayors, and the
national park authorities had already rejected two
possible locations for a retention area. Both
Bokartisz members and local mayors outside the
Bokartisz coalition were aware of this situation.
They offered an area close to the town of Cigánd in
the Bodrogköz region to the preparatory body for
the new water policy as an alternative location for
a retention polder. In the words of the leader of
Bokartisz (personal communication, 22 August
2007, Bodrogköz), "Another key element in the
success was that we could find a territory that we
could offer. There was a territory always affected
by inland water stagnation without high nature
value: Cigánd." The leader of Bokartisz reported
that he was aware of this opportunity before the
more detailed planning process started in 2003. It
remained less clear when and how the local mayors
began to support Cigánd as a location for a VTT
retention area. In general, they were keen to
highlight secondary benefits they ensured for their
municipality by participating in the planning
process. These benefits ranged from national
funding for a municipal sewerage system to city
status for Cigánd, extending the legal status,
financial resources, and status in parliament of the
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local government representatives. The management
of interests and (financial) resources, either to
facilitate or slow the transition in water policy,
emerged as a strategy. A witness of the changes in
the Bodrogköz stated that (personal communication,
23 October 2007, Bodrogköz) "[t]hose opposing the
plan thought it would never pass parliament. When
it did, they were shocked. The easiest and most
efficient way to block it is though the budget."
Related to interest management were strategies that
sidestepped good governance principles such as
transparency and accountability. These strategies of
individuals deserve more attention in future
research.
A further observation with respect to the analyzed
strategies is the divergent framing of new policy
ideas. Whereas civil servants and their technical
experts described the new policy ideas as an
effective response to new challenges in water
management, coalition members stressed that the
new ideas had roots in history and tradition and
opposed prevailing water management.
With respect to managing networks in the region,
legacy effects were strong, with prior social
networks and the historic legitimacy of actors
determining the nature of the game. Policy analysts
should be careful not to overlook the activities of
the private sector and consequently omit a
potentially important actor and partner. Whereas the
origin, advocacy, and management related to the
new policy ideas in the Tisza did not lie with bigger
private agents, their cooperation became crucial in
implementing the new ideas for two important
reasons. First, interventions in the floodplain
required the cooperation of landowners. Second,
implementation of water policy in Hungary could
no longer rely solely on national government
support. New partnerships had to be built. The new
water policy required the cooperation of many
partners. It called for an in-depth examination of
multi-stakeholder organizations and institutions
that were not well understood at the time of the
transition in water policy and that represented an
emerging and complex factor in many countries
around the world.
Finally, it is important to consider to what extent
the explored strategies are complementary.
Theoretically, looking for 'windows of opportunity'
is more oriented towards finding the right time to
present ideas, whereas 'venue shopping' is more
about finding or creating the right place. In practice
in the Tisza case, however, these strategies were
found to overlap, as individuals aimed to find the
right place at the right time to promote ideas or
oppose change.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper focused on individuals and the strategies
they used to facilitate a transition in water policy in
Tisza. With regard to the two elements of a transition
in water policy - change seen in policy substance or
in governance arrangements - the Tisza case
exhibits little formal organizational change
sustained beyond plan development. In fact, actors
identified coordination and clarity of the
organizational structure as components that have
been sorely lacking in the implementation phase
(Werners et al. 2009). This is one of the challenges
that actors in the Tisza presently face as the
implementation of the policy has been slow and
could still fail. Close analysis of the role of
individuals during implementation may uncover
strategies complementary to those we discussed. In
addition, an analysis based on stakeholder interest
could be a valuable addition to the idea-centered
approach taken in this paper.
We explored five potential strategies of individuals:
developing new ideas, building coalitions to sell
ideas, using windows of opportunity, playing
multiple venues, and orchestrating networks. We
conclude that these strategies and the focus on
individuals offer a simple and edifying frame for
exploring a transition in water policy. Assessing the
transition from the perspective of individuals and
their strategies yields a number of new insights
about a turbulent time, with each strategy pointing
at different key actors and events. Important lessons
include that the founders of a new coalition linked
different objectives to their new ideas. Furthermore,
while this coalition elaborated its ideas at the
regional level, national policymakers recognized a
window of opportunity to link regional support to
the policy change being advocated and supported
financially at the international level. Development
of the policy saw new venues and networks arise
that proved influential during the transition. Beyond
the importance of developing and debating new
ideas, the Tisza case shows that it takes individuals
to initiate a transition and people that can take new
ideas through a period of confrontation, change, and
reorganization.
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